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Abstract. An attribute-based credential (ABC), an authentic personal electronic piece of infor-
mation to perform transactions, offers a secure and privacy-preserving method to authorize user
transactions. One of the most important techniques to realize ABCs is the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya
signature. In this paper we extend its underlying cryptographic algorithms with the designation prop-
erty. As a result, the showing protocol between a user and a verifier does not require an additional
secure channel to perform credential proofs.
1 Introduction
Our modern, fully-interconnected, always-online society relies on a huge number of daily
electronic transactions in order to operate, develop and thrive. Internet-based transactions
enable e-banking, online commerce and digital communications, while embedded systems
and smart cards enable and enhance transactions with public transport, mobile services,
electronic purses and TV services.
Authentication methods are required in most of these applications. Although digital
credentials provide authenticity, they often include a unique identifier which allows elec-
tronic transactions performed by the same user to be linked. Notably, the user may be
subject to targeted advertisement without established consent. Racial, medical or personal
traits can lead to discrimination and the user’s location may be determined.
In order to address and mitigate the aforementioned privacy threats, several public
agencies encouraged advances in credential technology. The European Network and In-
formation Security Agency (ENISA) emphasized the need for “privacy-respecting” use of
unique identifiers in European identity cards, the Ontario Privacy Commissioner underlined
the necessity of a user-centric approach that embeds privacy into the design and architec-
ture of credential systems [9], while National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
issued a strategy towards a user-centric “identity ecosystem” [8]. Last, the European Union
promoted legislation (Directive 95/46/EC, General Data Protection Regulation) that en-
forces the user’s control over his personal data and credentials and establishes privacy by
design.
Attribute-Based Credentials (ABCs) emerged as a viable privacy-enhancing technique
that implements the new requirements. An attribute based credential is issued to the user
by a trusted identity provider. The user’s ABC contains his personal attributes, similar
to physical identity documents. The structure of the ABC allows the user to prove to a
third party that he possesses a specific attribute without actually revealing the credential
identifier. In particular, he is capable of using a zero-knowledge protocol to prove that
he is older than 18 years old, without making his name or identity number public. More-
over, by employing the selective disclosure feature, he can always reveal the minimum
required subset of personal attributes in each transaction. Several, cryptographic primi-
tives implement ABC functionality: Microsoft’s U-Prove, based on the discrete logarithm
representations (DL-REPs) and the Schnorr signature [3,5,11], and IBM’s Idemix, based
on the Camenisch–Lysyanskaya (CL) signature [1,10]. The focus of this research is the CL
scheme’s existing and desirable functionalities.
Specifically, since only recent efforts try to move ABCs from cryptography to real-world
solutions, no general consensus has been reached with respect to the desired properties of
the underlying zero-knowledge protocols. Both Schnorr-based and the CL schemes are
vulnerable to information leakage (e.g. learning if a user possesses a certain attribute or
not), since the selective disclosure procedure can be eavesdropped if an insecure channel
is used. The Schnorr-based protocols are more susceptible to identifier leakage, due to
the static nature of the signature—as we will see later, it does not provide multi-show
unlinkability. Moreover, the current cryptographic basis cannot detect or stop a malicious
terminal that impersonates a legitimate one.
These issues can be solved, to a certain extent, by employing an additional layer of
authentication and encryption below the zero-knowledge proof, using standard public key
cryptography. However, this approach is not efficient when it comes to resource-limited
devices such as embedded systems and smart cards. Even in a modern desktop computer,
where the computational overhead is small, an additional layer of authentication may leak
identifiers. To tackle this problem, we added designation [4] to the CL scheme. Instead
of the additional layer, we integrated public key cryptography within the zero-knowledge
proof. This allows a user to share attributes only with a particular party, making sure that
these attributes are revealed only to the designated verifier and does not leak elsewhere.
Previous research by Alpa´r et al. [2] has extended the cryptographic basis of DL-REP with
the designation feature. Still, the internal structure of Schnorr-based schemes does not
allow a credential to be shown more than once as it does not offer multi-show unlinkability.
On the other hand, the CL signature is randomized in every transaction, which provides
inherent multi-show unlinkability. By adding designation, we can achieve the best of both
worlds.
In summary, our research extends the cryptographic basis of the CL signature used
in Idemix by adding the designation feature. The resulting zero-knowledge proof is secure
assuming the CL signature is secure, which in turn relies on the strong RSA assumption.
2 Technical Background
In this section we introduce attribute based credentials in more detail, and explain the
basis of Idemix: the Camenisch Lysyanskaya signatures.
2.1 ABCs and their features
An attribute-based credential (ABC) is a cryptographically protected collection of user
attributes. First, an authoritative source, the so-called issuer issues it to a user via an
issuance protocol, and later the user can present it to a relying party, or verifier, via a
showing protocol.
Fig. 1. The core modules of ABCs: issuer, user, verifier.
ABCs need to implement specific cryptographic features that provide security for the
system and privacy for the users. Specifically, unforgeability prevents non-authoritative
parties to issue valid credentials. Non-transferability ensures that users cannot share their
credentials. Issuing unlinkability makes sure that the issuer cannot recognize credentials
when they take part in showing protocols. Multi-show unlinkability renders it impossible
for verifiers to link activities of the same user, meaning also that a credential cannot be
inherently correlated with its uses.
This paper adds an additional feature to ABCs, namely the designation feature. In
the context of a zero-knowledge proof used in ABCs, designation integrates public key
cryptography inside the proof. As a result, the improved showing protocol can ensure
that only the designated verifier will be able to verify the user’s credential. Adding the
designation property has minimal impact on the aforementioned scheme (Figure 1), since
it affects only the showing protocol between the user and the verifier, while the issuing
protocol remains unaltered.
2.2 Camenisch–Lysyanskaya signature
Existing ABC technologies [10] use the signature scheme proposed by Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya (CL scheme) [1]. Its security relies on the strong RSA assumption and it pro-
vides efficient zero-knowledge proofs. Before presenting our designated variant, we briefly
recall the CL scheme.
The scheme requires a system parameter n = pq, where p, q are safe primes, gen-
erated randomly by the issuer and kept secret. All computations are performed in the
quadratic residue QRn subgroup of Z∗n. The issuer also generates the public constants
R0, . . . , Rl, S, Z ∈ QRn. A basic CL signature on a block of l + 1 messages is constructed
as follows.
Signature generation: Signature verification:
A :=
(
Z
Rm00 ...R
ml
l S
υ
)1/e
mod n Z
?≡ AeRm00 . . . Rmll Sυ (mod n)
By knowing the prime factors p and q, the issuer can compute 1/e (mod ϕ(n)) (e
and υ are random numbers) and then A. The resulting signature on a block of messages
m0, . . . ,ml is (e, A, υ). Given a signature and the system parameters, a signature can
efficiently be confirmed by the verification equation.
When the CL signature is used for creating attribute-based credentials, l attributes
are represented as numbers m1, . . . ,ml and m0 is the user’s secret key. To achieve the
desired privacy properties, the credential issuing (signing) and its verification happen in
a more intricate way than in the basic signature scheme. As the issuing protocol is in
fact a blind signature, the issuer does not learn the user’s secret key m0 and the resulting
signature (e, A, υ). This provides the issuing unlinkability feature. By using randomization
and zero-knowledge-proof techniques while showing a credential, a user can achieve multi-
show unlinkability.
3 Designated Showing Protocol with CL
In this section we present the new credential showing protocol that integrates the designa-
tion property (Table 1). The user proves possession of a credential with l attributes, while
keeping the value of all the attributes secret. This prove is designated to the verifier. We
followed similar techniques as Bringer [4] and Alpa´r et al. [2]. Every verifier has a private-
public key pair (k, V ). During the showing protocol V is used to derive a designator De.
The verifier is the only one that possesses the secret key k, and thus, he is the only one
capable of verifying the zero-knowledge proof.
The designated showing protocol’s public input consists of the CL constants (Z, S,R0,
. . . , Rl−1), the RSA modulus n and the public key V , used for designation purposes. The
private input to the scheme contains the corresponding designation private key k and the
secret attributes m0, . . . ,ml. After the standard randomization process, the ZK commit-
ment phase commits to the secret attributes (using values s, t, {wi}) and generates the
designator De. The User sends the commitment Co and designator De and upon receival
of the Verifier’s challenge c he generates the response, based on the secret attributes {mi},
the values s, t, {wi} and the designator exponent b. Following that, the Verifier computes
the verification equation using the commitment Co, the designator De and the secret
designation key k.
The verification equation needs to be adapted because the designation value De would
require to take k-th root. This is not a problem in [2,4] where the order of the group,
which is essential in taking roots, is a public system parameter. In the CL setting, where
the strong RSA assumption holds, it is impossible to take roots; therefore, we need to
restructure the verification equation.
The primary goal of designation is to make it impossible for any external parties to
verify the validity of a proof. This can also be achieved by encrypting the whole conversation
using a shared key between the user and the verifier. We note, however, that this might not
be efficient – due to the large amount of communication overhead and possible identifier
leakage during a prior key setup phase. On the user’s side the computational costs of
designation is only one modular exponentiation V b when compared with the CL scheme,
which is feasible even on devices with limited resources, such as smart cards.
User
m0: secret key
m1, . . . ,ml: attributes
Signature (A, e, υ)
υ , size lυ bits
e , size le bits
Randomization
r ∈R {0, 1}ln+l∅
υˆ = υ − er (in Z)
A′ = AS−r
ZK Proof
t ∈R {0, 1}le+l∅+lH
s ∈R {0, 1}lυ+l∅+lH
wi ∈R {0, 1}lm+lH+l∅
Co = A′tSsRw00 . . . R
wl
l
b ∈R {0,1}lm+lH+l∅
De = Vb
rt = c ∗ e+ t
rs = c ∗ υˆ + s
∀mi, wi, i ∈ {0, . . . , l}
rmi = c ∗mi + wi+b
Public
Z, S,R0, . . . , Rl−1 ∈ QRn
n: RSA modulus, size ln bits
V: Verifier’s public key
l∅: size of security interval
lH : length of hash function
A′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{Co,De}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
c
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
{rt, rs, rm0 , . . . , rml}
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verifier
k: Verifier’s private key
V = (Πl−1i=0Ri)
k
c ∈R {0, 1}lc
Verification:
Zkc =
(A′rtSrsR
rm0
0 . . .R
rml
l )
k∗
Co−k ∗De−1
Table 1. Designated, multi-attribute, zero-knowledge CL protocol in which no attribute is revealed. We use bold
typesetting to denote the extra computations compared to the CL scheme. By removing the bold parts and replacing
the verification equation with A′rtSrsR
rm0
0 . . . R
rml
l = Z
cCo, one obtains the original, non-designated, multi-
attribute CL scheme.
4 Security Analysis and Discussion
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed scheme and provide a comparison
between the designated CL protocol and the existing designated DL-REP scheme, with
respect to the offered security features and performance. The comparison is summarized
in Table 2.
Security. The security of the designated CL zero-knowledge proof relies on the security of
the original CL scheme which is secure under the strong RSA assumption.
We give an informal description of a security reduction to the security of the showing
protocol of the original CL scheme. The additional elements in the transcript of the zero-
knowledge proof of the designated scheme are De and the modified responses {rmi}i=0,...,l.
De is a commitment to a random element b which is added to each original cmi+wi. These
elements can easily be added to the original CL scheme by an outside party. Therefore, an
adversary that can break the security of the designated scheme can be used to break the
security of the original CL scheme.
The properties of completeness, zero-knowledge, and special soundness hold for the
designated CL.
Designation. While the techniques applied in the Schnorr/DL-REP schemes and in the
CL scheme to make designation possible are similar, there is a surprisingly substantial
difference. Consider the validation of credentials in the two designated schemes. We recall
that in [2,4], after a proof of an identifier, the verifier has to look it up in a database of all
valid identifiers . This additional step and the extra database are not required here. While
a DL-REP can be produced by anyone, a CL signature can only be computed by the issuer.
Therefore, proving a CL signature immediately proves validity of a credential. Furthermore,
since Schnorr identifiers and DL-REPs cannot be randomized like a CL signature, a proof
of knowledge directly exposes the identifier. (Essentially, they prove that the user knows
the exponent(s) of the public value I = gx or I = gx00 . . . g
xl
l in the Schnorr or the DL-REP
schemes, respectively.)
Issuer-Show Unlinkability. This property guaranteed by the blind signature produced by
the issuer during issuance. The issuer does not learn the secret key nor the resulting signa-
ture corresponding to the credential. Therefore, the issuer cannot recognize the credential
when it is later shown. As blind signature can be realized in (designated) Schnorr-like
schemes as well as in the (designated) CL scheme, they both meet this requirement.
Multi-show Unlinkability. As mentioned, the user is capable of fully randomizing the sig-
nature before sharing it with a verifier. Thus, it fulfills the requirements for multi-show
unlinkability and this property is retained under designation. Designated Schnorr does not
provide this feature and it recommends the usage of multiple signature tokens in order to
‘randomize’ each transaction [11], which requires more storage.
Performance. One of the main drawbacks of CL schemes is its reliance on RSA groups,
which require at least 1024-bit keys to achieve an appropriate level of security. On the other
hand, Schnorr/DL-REP/U-Prove schemes operate in groups where the DL assumption
holds, which means at least a 1024-bit prime-group size or a 160-bit elliptic-curve group.
A U-Prove (prime group) implementation on MULTOS smart cards [6] achieved a showing
protocol (five attributes proof of knowledge) less than 0.7 second computation time, while
the CL scheme for similar parameters [13] resulted in almost 1.3 seconds. Moreover, the
U-Prove results can be even further improved with an elliptic group implementation.
5 Conclusions
We proposed a new cryptographic scheme, the designated multi-attribute CL, rendering
a user of Idemix capable of revealing his attributes only to a designated verifier, without
risking identity leakage or identification. The scheme does not modify the issuing and
Property Designated DL-REP Designated CL
Designation applied on signature applied on identifier
Issuer-showing unlinkability fulfilled strongly fulfilled
Multi-show unlinkability not fulfilled fulfilled
Performance faster slower
Table 2. Comparison table between designated Camenisch–Lysyanskaya scheme and designated DL-REP/Schnorr
schemes [2].
causes just a slight overhead in the showing protocol. We also examined the security and
privacy properties of the suggested scheme and compared it with the existing designated
DL-REP protocols. In general, we consider the attribute based credentials to be a viable
and secure solution for privacy-sensitive applications which are in-line with technical and
legal guidelines for privacy protection. On the other hand, there are still several open
issues regarding the desired ABC properties and device deployment. For future work, we
suggest establishing a solid set of the required cryptographic schemes and make sure that
all of them are compliant with the current regulation. Furthermore, we encourage efforts
in standardizing ABC protocols, usage, system deployment and interoperability to assist
this nascent technology in becoming mainstream.
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